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SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 Ronald Bilinski appealed the District Court’s dismissal of his pro se complaint 
that asserted multiple federal and state law causes of action against Dr. Samuel Houston, 
Wills Eye Hospital, and twenty-five other defendants.1  After we granted Bilinski’s 
request for the appointment of counsel,2 pro bono counsel argued that the District Court 
had erred by granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss Bilinski’s medical malpractice 
claims for failure to file the Certificate of Merit (COM) required under Pennsylvania 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3(a).3  We agree.   
I. 
                                                 
1 Among the numerous other defendants are several persons and entities associated with 
Wills Eye Hospital.  For simplicity, we refer to them collectively as Wills Eye Hospital.  
Bilinski also sued Dr. Houston, Retinovitreous Associates, Ltd., and several other persons 
associated with that entity.  We refer to those defendants collectively as Dr. Houston.  
  
2 The Court extends its thanks to Attorney Sara Solow for representing Bilinski pro bono 
during this appellate proceeding. 
  
3 Rule 1042.3 requires plaintiffs alleging “that a licensed professional deviated from an 
acceptable professional standard” to file a COM.  Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a).  Relevant to 
this appeal, subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3) of the Rule provide that the COM consists of a 
written statement either by (1) an appropriate licensed professional “that there exists a 
reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the 
treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable 
professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm” 
sustained by the plaintiff, or (3) counsel or the party indicating that “expert testimony . . . 
is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim.”  Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a)(1), (a)(3).  In 
Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, we held that this state rule is “substantive law 
under the Erie Rule and must be applied as such by federal courts.”  659 F.3d 258, 265 




 According to Ronald Bilinski’s pro se amended complaint, he has had some visual 
impairment in his left eye since 1965, but 20-20 vision in his right eye.  A45-46.  On 
December 15, 2013, Bilinski went to Wills Eye Hospital’s emergency room because 
“snow + ice [were] hitting [his] good right eye.”  A46.  The following day, he had an 
operation and “Dr. Reed restored [his] vision [in the right eye] back to 20-20.”  Id. 
 During a follow-up evaluation for new glasses on June 16, 2014, Dr. Samuel 
Houston “looked in [Bilinski’s] right eye”, then left “screaming [‘]Oh, Oh, Oh, Oh[’] 
repeatedly,” causing Bilinski to go “into shock.”  A80-82.  Dr. Houston “made [Bilinski] 
follow him,” and then “lasered [Bilinski’s] right eye [and] ruined it,” leaving Bilinski 
blind in that eye.  A82, 47.  Bilinski alleges that Dr. Houston, without Bilinski’s consent, 
performed an unnecessary operation and “hurt” him.  A82.    
 Thereafter, Bilinski initiated this civil action against Dr. Houston, Wills Eye 
Hospital and numerous other defendants.  Bilinski alleged multiple federal and state 
causes of action, including that the defendants were liable for negligence and had 
operated without obtaining Bilinski’s informed consent (collectively referred to as the 
medical malpractice claims).4  Under Rule 1042.3(a), a COM must be filed either with a 
                                                 
4 Although Bilinski appealed the dismissal of all of his claims against all of the 
defendants, his pro bono counsel acknowledged that this appeal does not require review 
of any claims other than the professional negligence and lack of informed consent claims.  
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1 n.1. Furthermore, counsel does not take issue with the 
dismissal of any claims against defendants Dr. Michael A. DellaVecchia and the City of 
Philadelphia, Trustee under the Will of James Wills, Deceased, Acting by the Board of 
Directors of City Trusts (Board of Directors).  Id.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s orders dismissing Bilinski’s non-medical malpractice claims against all 
of the defendants and the dismissal of the medical malpractice claims against Dr. 
DellaVecchia and the Board of Directors.  
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complaint alleging medical malpractice or within sixty days after such a complaint is 
filed.  When this sixty day period expired and Bilinski had failed to file a COM, some of 
the defendants filed a “Notice of Intention to Enter Judgment of Non Pros” on the 
medical malpractice claims.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.6.  In response, Bilinski filed a brief 
and a COM which indicated, as permitted under Rule 1042.3(a)(3), that “expert 
testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the 
claim against Defendants.”  A300; see Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a)(3).  The defendants then 
filed motions to dismiss all of Bilinski’s claims.  As to his medical malpractice claims, 
the defendants asserted that Bilinski’s COM under Rule 1042.3(a)(3) was inadequate 
because he would need expert testimony to establish that the medical professionals had 
deviated from the acceptable standard of care. 
 The District Court thoughtfully addressed all of Bilinski’s claims, explaining why 
dismissal was warranted.  In addressing Bilinski’s medical malpractice claims, the 
District Court noted that Pennsylvania law generally requires expert testimony in medical 
malpractice actions, unless the “matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care is so 
obvious as to be within the range of experience and comprehension of even non-
professional persons.”  A9 (omitting citation and internal quotation marks).  Given the 
nature of Bilinski’s ophthalmologic claims, the District Court determined that Bilinski 
would need to present expert testimony to establish the elements of the negligence action.  
The Court also concluded that a COM was required if Bilinski were to prevail on his 
claim that the defendants operated without his informed consent.  A10.  Because of 
Bilinski’s pro se status and a belief that Bilinski might have been confused by the Rule’s 
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requirements, the District Court gave Bilinski another thirty days to file the statement of a 
licensed professional as contemplated by Rule 1042.3(a)(1).  A10.   
 Bilinski refused.  In response to the Court’s memorandum, Bilinski stated that 
“you are not even getting a COMerit, I am sticking to my guns, and I checked [the] block 
I checked, cause of a simple comon [sic] sense law.”  Bilinski v. Wills Eye Hosp., No. 
2:16-cv-02728, ECF No. 116 at 10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016).  Because Bilinski elected at 
this stage in the litigation to proceed without expert testimony, he was bound by his 
certification and would be precluded, absent exceptional circumstances, from presenting 
expert testimony at summary judgment or trial.  Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a)(3), Note. 
 Thereafter, Dr. Houston filed a second motion to dismiss, which Wills Eye 
Hospital joined.  Dr. Houston urged dismissal based upon Bilinski’s failure to file a COM 
and a written statement by a licensed professional within thirty days as ordered by the 
District Court.  The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.  This timely appeal 
followed.5 
II. 
 Bilinski contends that the District Court failed to comply with the directives of 
Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011).  There, we 
concluded that the District Court had erred by dismissing a pro se plaintiff’s professional 
                                                 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1367.  We 
exercise final order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the issue of whether 
the District Court erred in granting the motion to dismiss for failure to file a Rule 
1042.3(a)(1) COM presents a question of law, our review is plenary.  Schmigel v. Uchal, 
800 F.3d 113, 116 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015).  
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liability claim because she had submitted, as permitted by Rule 1042.3(a)(3), a COM that 
indicated that expert testimony was not required to prove her case.  We declared:  
There is no basis in Pennsylvania law that would permit a district court to 
reject a filing under Rule 1042.3(a)(3) in favor of one filed under Rule 
1042.3(a)(1).  Pennsylvania law expressly allows a plaintiff to proceed on 
the basis of a certification that expert testimony will not be required to 
prove her claim.  Of course, the consequence of such a filing is a 
prohibition against offering expert testimony later in the litigation, absent 
“exceptional circumstances.” . . . A filing under this rule allows the case to 
proceed to discovery, leaving the consequence of Liggon-Redding’s 
decision to be dealt with at a later stage of the litigation, such as summary 
judgment or trial.  This is the course of action the District Court should 
follow on remand. 
 
659 F.3d at 265.  (citation omitted). 
 Like the District Court in Liggon-Redding, the District Court erred by granting the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Bilinski’s COM filed under Rule 
1042.3(a)(3) was inadequate.  Id.  A COM under Rule 1042.3(a)(3) that indicates the 
plaintiff will not adduce expert testimony may be an appropriate basis for summary 
judgment, but it does not provide a ground for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.  Id. 
 Dr. Houston and Wills Eye Hospital assert that we should affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal on an alternative ground.  They contend that the District Court 
essentially converted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).  Because a lack of necessary expert 
testimony is an appropriate basis for granting summary judgment, Dr. Houston and Wills 
Eye Hospital submit that we should affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 
 The District Court did not issue a summary judgment ruling.  Dr. Houston and 
Wills Eye Hospital moved for dismissal and, in ruling on that motion, the District Court 
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did not provide Bilinski notice of any intention to convert the motion to one for summary 
judgment as required by Rule 12(d).  See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 
1989).  Moreover, Liggon-Redding made clear that a Rule 1042.3(a)(3) COM may serve 
as the basis for summary judgment.  659 F.3d at 265.  We reiterated this point in 
Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2015), instructing that “the COM 
requirement and its conditions are facts that can form the basis for a motion for summary 
judgment.”  We also noted that a “motion for summary judgment can be filed whenever 
appropriate.”  Id.  Despite the clarity of our case law, Dr. Houston and Wills Eye Hospital 
ask us to relieve them from the consequences of their decision to file a motion to dismiss.  
We decline their invitation.  Instead, we will reverse the District Court’s dismissal of 
Bilinski’s medical malpractice claims and remand for further proceedings.  
III. 
 Finally, we note that pro bono counsel asserts that Bilinski’s pro se complaint, 
which must be construed liberally, adequately alleges claims for gross negligence and 
battery.  See Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that a 
pro se plaintiff’s pleading must be liberally read) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 
520-21 (1972)).  These claims, counsel contends, do not require expert discovery and 
should be allowed to proceed to discovery.  Because we are remanding this matter for 
further proceedings, we will leave the issue of whether the complaint adequately alleges 




 We appreciate the District Court’s attempt to assist Bilinski in prosecuting his 
claim by examining whether expert testimony was required under Pennsylvania law and 
affording him additional time.  Nonetheless, it was error to conclude that Bilinski’s COM 
under Rule 1042.3(a)(3) provided a basis for granting the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss.  We will reverse the District Court’s order dismissing Bilinski’s 
medical malpractice claims against Dr. Houston and Wills Eye Hospital.  We will affirm 
the District Court’s orders dismissing all of Bilinski’s other non-medical malpractice 
claims against all of the defendants.  We will also affirm the District Court’s order 
dismissing the medical malpractice claims against Dr. DellaVecchia and the Board of 
Directors.   
 
